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We characterize the set of shared quantum states which contain a cryptographically private key.
This allows us to recast the theory of privacy as a paradigm closely related to that used in entangle-
ment manipulation. It is shown that one can distill an arbitrarily secure key from bound entangled
states. There are also states which have less distillable private key than the entanglement cost of
the state. In general the amount of distillable key is bounded from above by the relative entropy
of entanglement. Relationships between distillability and distinguishability are found for a class of
states which have Bell states correlated to separable hiding states. We also describe a technique for
finding states exhibiting irreversibility in entanglement distillation.
Recently, strong connections have been emerging be-
tween the amount of pure entanglement ED and the pri-
vate key KD one can distill from a shared quantum state.
For example, the security of key generation in BB84 [1]
and B92 [2] can be proven by showing its equivalence
with entanglement distillation of singlets [3][4]. These
proofs had their origin in the idea of quantum privacy
amplification [5] where two parties (Alice and Bob) dis-
till pure quantum entanglement until the quantum cor-
relations are completely disentangled with an eavesdrop-
per (Eve). Those correlations were represented by singlet
states and were subsequently measured to obtain a classi-
cal private key to which Eve had no access. Very recently,
the hashing inequality [6, 7] was proven [8] by showing
the equivalence between certain distillation protocols and
one way secret key distillation.
An apparent equivalence between bound entangled
states (states which require entanglement to create, but
from which no pure entanglement can be distilled) and
classical distributions which can not be turned into a key
was conjectured in [9]. Additionally, using techniques de-
veloped in entanglement theory, a gap similar to the one
between entanglement cost and distillable entanglement
was shown to exist classically for private keys [10]. It has
also been shown that for two qubits, a state is one copy
distillable iff it is cryptographically secure [27] [11] (c.f.
[12, 13]), and there are basic laws which govern the in-
terplay of key generation in terms of sent quantum states
[14].
In fact, the original papers on entanglement distilla-
tion [6] used protocols which were derived from existed
protocols for distilling privacy from classical probability
distributions. Indeed, formal analogies between entan-
glement and secrecy exist [15]. The evidence to date
strongly supports the widely held belief that privacy and
entanglement distillation are strictly equivalent – that
one can get a private key from a quantum state if and
only if entanglement distillation is possible.
Surprisingly, this is not the case - we will introduce
a class of bound entangled states (no pure entanglement
can be distilled from them), from which one can distill
a private key. Examples of states that have one bit of
perfect private key and at the some time arbitrarily small
distillable entanglement are also provided.
Clearly, one always has KD ≥ ED since one can always
distill singlets from a state, and then use these singlets to
generate a private key [16]. Here, we prove that one can
also have the strict inequality KD > ED, which some-
times holds even if ED = 0. We will also prove that the
private key is generally bounded from above by the rela-
tive entropy of entanglement Er [17] (regularized). This
will be sufficient to prove that one can have KD < Ec
where Ec is the entanglement cost (the number of sin-
glets required to prepare a state under LOCC). This en-
ables one to easily find states for which ED < Er. In
the present paper we will state some of the results and
present the full proofs in detail elsewhere [18].
We will first introduce a wide class of states which are
the most general private states in the sense that one can
produce one bit of secure key from them even though
an eavesdropper might hold the purification of the state.
One can think of these states as being the equivalent of
the singlet for key distillation. This will allow us to recast
all protocols of key distillation (classical or otherwise) in
terms of distillation of private states using the distant
labs paradigm used in entanglement theory i.e local op-
erations and classical communication (LOCC). Next we
show that these states can have arbitrary little distillable
entanglement while still retaining one bit of private key.
We can relate this to the problem of distinguishability of
states under LOCC. We then exhibit a bound entangled
state from which a private key can be distilled. We then
prove that KD ≤ Er and discuss the consequences.
Let us now introduce private states i.e. γABA′B′ where
systems AB are both m-qubits, and measurement of AB
in the computational basis gives m bits of perfect key.
2Systems AA′ (BB′) are held by Alice (Bob). We assume
the usual scenario - that any part of the state which is
not with Alice and Bob might be with an eavesdropper
Eve. Thus Eve holds the purification of this state. We
will now provide their unique form. We first consider
perfect security.
Theorem 1. A state is private in the above sense iff it
is of the following form
γm = U |ψ+2m〉AB〈ψ+2m | ⊗ ̺A′B′U † (1)
where |ψ+d 〉 =
∑d
i=1 |ii〉 and ̺A′B′ is an arbitrary state
on A′,B′. U is an arbitrary unitary controlled in the
computational basis
U =
2m∑
i,j=1
|ij〉AB〈ij| ⊗ UA
′B′
ij . (2)
We will call the operation (2) ”twisting” (note that
only UA
′B′
ii matter here, yet it will be useful to consider
general twisting later).
Proof. We will prove for m = 1 (for higher m, the
proof is analogous). Start with an arbitrary state held
by Alice and Bob, ρAA′BB′ , and include its purification
to write the total state in the decomposition
ΨABA′B′,E = a|00〉AB|Ψ00〉A′B′E + b|01〉AB|Ψ01〉A′B′E
+c|10〉AB|Ψ10〉A′B′E + d|11〉AB|Ψ11〉A′B′E (3)
with the states |ij〉 on AB and Ψij on A′B′E. Since the
key is unbiased and perfectly correlated, we must have
b = c = 0 and |a|2 = |d|2 = 1/2. Depending on whether
the key is |00〉 or |11〉, Eve will hold the states
̺0 = TrA′B′ |Ψ00〉〈Ψ00|, ̺1 = TrA′B′ |Ψ11〉〈Ψ11| (4)
Perfect security requires ̺0 = ̺1. Thus there exists uni-
taries U00 and U11 on A
′B′ such that
|Ψ00〉 =
∑
i
√
pi|U0φA
′B′
i 〉|ϕEi 〉
|Ψ11〉 =
∑
i
√
pi|U1φA
′B′
i 〉|ϕEi 〉 . (5)
After tracing out E, we will thus get a state of the form
Eq. (1), where ̺A′B′ =
∑
i pi|φi〉〈φi|.
It is instructive to see the matrix of a general γ1-state:
γ1 =


σ 0 0 X
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
X† 0 0 σ′

 (6)
where the matrix is written in the computational basis on
AB i.e. |00〉, |01〉, |10〉, |11〉 and the trace norm of block
X is 1/2. Thus γ1 looks like a Bell state with blocks
instead of c-numbers, and the condition on ‖X‖ can be
associated with the fact that Bell states have the corre-
sponding element (coherence) equal to 1/2.
Let us briefly sketch the situation where one only de-
mands approximate security form = 1. Consider in place
of γ1 an arbitrary state written in similar block form.
One finds that the condition ||X ′|| ≈ 1/2, whereX ′ is the
upper right block, is equivalent to the state being close
to γ1 in norm. For the converse direction, one can verify
that in terms of the fidelity F (̺E0 , ̺
E
1 ) = Tr|
√
̺E
0
√
̺E
1
|
||X ′|| = √p0p1F (ρE0 , ρE1 ) (7)
where pi are probabilities of Alice and Bob to obtain
outcome ii, and ρEi are the corresponding Eve’s states.
Thus having approximate bit of key, i.e. uniformity p0 ≈
p1 ≈ 1/2 and security F (ρE1 , ρE2 ) ≈ 1 (implying ρE0 ≈ ρE1 )
is equivalent to sharing state close to γ1. The result can
be generalized to m > 1 [19].
and thus that the resulting state be close in norm to
some γ1.
This then completely recasts the drawing of key at a
rate KD under local operations and public communica-
tion (LOPC) in terms of distilling γm states (at a rate
of Kγ under LOCC). Clearly Kγ ≤ KD since distilling
γm is a particular way of drawing key. Additionally, by
Theorem 1, any secure protocol which distills KD is also
distilling γm with Kγ = KD when one considers all of
Alice and Bob’s lab as the A′B′ ancilla. I.e. if one ap-
plies some protocol coherently (since the original LOPC
protocol might be partly classical), one distills some γm
at the full rate. We thus have equality of the two rates.
Before showing that one can have bound entangled
states which give secure key, we provide examples of both
strict and approximate γ states, which have an arbitrarily
small amount of distillable entanglement i.e. KD ≫ ED.
Example 1. Consider states
̺ = p|ψ+〉〈ψ+| ⊗ ̺+ + (1 − p)|ψ−〉〈ψ−| ⊗ ̺− (8)
where ψ± = 1√2 (|00〉± |11〉) and ̺± reside on orthogonal
subspaces. One can verify that these states are particular
examples of γ1, and therefore produce at least one bit of
private key. Eve (who holds the purification of the state)
can learn the phase of the state on AB, i.e. whether
Alice and Bob hold ψ− or ψ+. She can help Alice and
Bob obtain one singlet by telling them which maximally
entangled state they possess. Yet she can learn nothing
about the key bit (i.e. whether they have |00〉 or |11〉. In
a sense, Eve can hold one bit of information but it is the
wrong bit of information. Such a situation is impossible
classically (or with pure quantum states held by Alice
and Bob).
To decrease the distillable entanglement, take p = (1+
1/d)/2 and ̺± to be two extreme Werner d⊗ d states
̺s =
2
d2 + d
Psym, ̺a =
2
d2 − dPas (9)
3with Pas, Psym the anti/symmetric projectors. The log-
negativity EN which is an upper bound on the distillable
entanglement ED [20] amounts in this case to EN (̺) =
log d+1
d
. Thus by increasing d one can have an arbitrary
small amount of distillable entanglement while keeping
one bit of private key.
Example 2. We take ̺± to be two separable hiding
states τ0 and τ1. We take here those given in [21]
τ0 = ̺
⊗l
s , τ1 = [(̺a + ̺s)/2]
⊗l
. (10)
By choosing d and l one can make them arbitrarily in-
distinguishable under LOCC and arbitrarily orthogonal
(since X = (τ1 − τ0), orthogonality of the τ ’s are needed
for security i.e. ‖X‖, while hiding is needed for low distil-
lability). Choosing p = 1/2, one can show that distilling
entanglement essentially reduces to Alice and Bob deter-
mining which maximally entangled state they possess by
performing measurements on the hiding state τ . Choos-
ing better and better hiding states decreases the distil-
lable entanglement arbitrarily. Again we check this by
use of log-negativity; one finds that EN (̺) = ||τΓ0 − τΓ1 ||
where Γ stands for partial transpose. This quantity has
been shown to be an upper bound for distinguishability
of the hiding states, and for suitable choice of l and d it
can be made arbitrarily small [21].
The idea behind both examples is similar: Alice and
Bob share mixture of two Bell states, with flags which are
flags distinguishable if one has access to the entire state -
this gives security, but are poorly distinguishable by local
operations and classical communication, which prevents
Alice and Bob knowing which Bell state they share, hence
dramatically decreases distillable entanglement. In both
examples however, the states do have nonzero distillable
entanglement. For strict γ states, it is not hard to see
that they are always distillable. It is then clear that
any key from bound entangled states can be arbitrarily
secure, but not perfectly secure.
Main result. We now introduce a bound entangled
state which can be shown to have KD > 0. We simply
take the preceding state, and introduce errors
ρ =


p
2 (τ0 + τ1) 0 0
p
2 (τ1 − τ0)
0 (12 − p)τ0 0 0
0 0 (12 − p)τ0 0
p
2 (τ1 − τ0) 0 0 p2 (τ0 + τ1)


(11)
One finds that for p ≤ 1/3 and l
√
1−p
p
(d − 1) ≥ d the
state has positive partial transpose (PPT) being there-
fore bound entangled [22].
Now, we take n copies, and apply the recurrence dis-
tillation protocol of [23] without the twirling step. The
resulting state is
ρ′ =
1
N


[p2 (τ0 + τ1)]
⊗n 0 0 [p2 (τ1 − τ0)]⊗n
0 [(12 − p)τ0]⊗n 0 0
0 0 [(12 − p)τ0]⊗n 0
[p2 (τ1 − τ0)]⊗n 0 0 [p2 (τ0 + τ1)]⊗n


(12)
where N = 2pn + 2 (1/2− p)n. To see that Alice and
Bob have arbitrarily secure key, we check that the trace
norm of off-diagonal block ‖X‖ tends to 1/2:
∥∥[p
2
(τ1 − τ2)]⊗n/N
∥∥ = 1
2
(
1− 1
2l
)n 1
1 +
(
1−2p
2p
)n (13)
Now, for p > 1/4 the norm can be arbitrarily close to 1/2
if we had previously taken l large enough, and now take
large n. Given such l, one could always have initially
chosen d to satisfy the PPT condition of the initial state
(11), so that the state ρ′ is PPT (as it is obtained from
ρ by LOCC).
Remark. Note that we need to use large l for security,
large n for the state to approximate perfect key, and large
d for the state to be PPT. Indeed, large d is needed for
τi to be hiding states, and if they are not hiding, then
the state would be distillable by distinguishing between
them, and then distilling the correlated singlet.
Thus we have shown that we can get arbitrarily secure
bit from bound entangled states The structure of our
states sheds perhaps for the first time some light on the
phenomenon of bound entanglement: they can contain
singlets that are so “twisted”, they cannot be distilled,
but they can exhibit their quantum character through
privacy. This explanation probably cannot be applied to
low-dimensional bound entangled states.
Having show that one can draw one bit of key, we
now show that Alice and Bob can draw key at a nonzero
asymptotic rate, using
Lemma 1. For any state ψABA′BE consider the state
̺ABE emerging after measurement on AB in the stan-
dard basis. The latter state does not change under twist-
ing. (the proof boils down to direct checking)
Since trace norm of the off-diagonal block (12) of the
state is close to 1/2, by use of polar decomposition, one
finds twisting operation after which trace of the block X
is equal to its trace norm. For such new state ρ′′, by
Lemma 1, Eve’s states correlated with outcomes of AB
measurements are still the same as for ρ′. Now how-
ever, after tracing out A′B′, the state is close to sin-
glet. Clearly, the problem is reduced to drawing key from
outcomes of measurement, from a state close to singlet,
which can be done, for example, by the protocol of Deve-
tak and Winter [8]. As we have already noted, this will
draw γ states at the same rate as KD when the corre-
sponding classical protocol is applied coherently.
We now provide a general upper bound on KD in
terms of the relative entropy of entanglement Er(ρ) :=
4infσ∈sepS(ρ||σ), with S(ρ||σ) := Tr[ρ(ln ρ − lnσ)] and
sep being the set of separable states. Namely we have
Theorem 2. KD(ρAB) ≤ E∞r (ρAB). where E∞r is
the regularization of the relative entropy of entanglement
E∞r (ρ) := limn→∞Er(ρ
⊗n)/n.
Our proof is inspired by the idea that transition rates
are bounded by LOCCmonotones [24], yet it needs essen-
tially new techniques, mostly due to possibility of large
scaling of the size of the ancilla A′B′ with the number of
obtained bits of key. We present it in [18].
Since we can have Er(ρ) < Ec(ρ) the above theorem
implies that for some states, the key rate will be strictly
less than the entanglement cost, and in fact, can be made
arbitrarily small for fixed Ec. E.g. for anti-symmetric
Werner state ̺a we have Ec(̺a) = 1 [25] while E
∞
r (̺a) =
log (d+ 2)/d which can be arbitrarily low.
In summary, we have found that in general ED ≤
KD ≤ E∞r ≤ Ec with strict inequalities ED < KD < Ec
and ED < E
∞
r also possible (the latter was shown pre-
viously in [26]; our result allows for easy construction of
new examples). One can even have KD > 0 for bound
entangled states. This implies that the rate of distillable
key is not only an operational measure of entanglement,
but is also non-trivial in that it is not equal to other
known operational measures: Ec and ED. This is also
likely to be true for the quantum key cost Kc which we
define to be the minimum sizem of γm required to form a
state in the asymptotic limit. These results also put into
question the possibility of “bound information” for bipar-
tite systems conjectured in [9], although the phenomena
may well exist for distributions derived from other bound
entangled states. Our results also suggest that the qual-
itative equivalence between privacy and distillability in
2 ⊗ 2 [11] is likely to be due to the fact that in low di-
mensions, bound entanglement does not exist.
One could define a unit of privacy, by calling γ1 ir-
reducible, if one and only one bit of privacy can be ob-
tained from it. Irreducible private state may therefore
be thought of as the basic unit state of privacy, much
as the singlet is the basic unit of entanglement theory
(although not all γ states are equivalent to each other,
thus one thinks of γm in its entirety). ¿From theorem 2 it
follows that irreducibility can be imposed by demanding
that γ1 have a relative entropy of entanglement of one.
However we do not know if this condition is too strong.
Here our interest in privacy is motivated by the funda-
mental insight it gives into entanglement – there seems to
exist a deep connection between the entanglement cost of
PPT states, and privacy. In terms of cryptographic pro-
tocols, the states considered here can be incorporated
into an actual scheme by performing a suitably random-
ized tomography protocol on the obtained states to verify
that they are indeed close to the expected form. Such a
protocol is highly inefficient, but appears to be secure for
binding entanglement channels, although the scaling of
security parameters may be qualitatively different than
in BB84. Determining how efficient such a protocol could
be is an interesting open problem.
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